Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers by Bishop, Joseph
Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.t
A vast pother has arisen in corporate circles over the dreadful plight
of officers and directors, beset on the one hand by predatory strike
suitors anxious to convert them and their little families into welfare
clients if their efforts to maximize the corporation's profits come to
grief, beset on the other by ruthless minions of the Antitrust Division
determined to throw them into the federal pen if those efforts suc.
ceed. Some, perhaps most, of the excitement has been generated by
the aggressive and imaginative propaganda of underwriters pushing
insurance against such hazards.' The general tenor of the insurance
companies' campaign is illustrated by its advertisements in the busi-
ness press-for example, an ad which features a composite photograph
of a board of directors presided over by a stuffed duck and the ex-
planatory text, "As a corporate director or officer, you may be a sit-
ting duck for a shareholder or third party liability suit."2 The pother
is not, however, entirely synthetic; there have in recent years been a
large number of highly publicized suits (or threats of suits) against
directors. Most of them rested on allegations that the directors were
feathering their personal nests at the corporation's expense, but a few
appeared to charge nothing worse than negligence, bad judgment, or
even misplaced altruism on the part of the defendant directors.'
t" Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. Dartmouth 1936; LL.B. Harvard 1940.
1. Such insurance has been the subject of a number of recent articles and comments
in legal and other periodicals. See, e.g., Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance
Against Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAw. 92 (1966); Note, Public Policy and
Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 COLUm. L. Rv. 716 (1967); Note, Liability Insurance for
Corporate Executives, 80 HARv. L. REv. 648 (1967); Wallace, Facts and Fallacies of Direc.
tors' and Officers' Liability, FINANCIA. ExECUTivE, Sept. 1967, at 2. The campaign has had
considerable success. A recent survey of 753 corporations showed that nearly 20 per cent
carry such insurance; the number of policies sold has risen from two in 1962 to 50 In
1966. J. BACON, COR'orATE DREcaroRsnIP PRAGrtc.s 124-25 (National Industrial Conference
Board, 1967).
2. Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1968, at 6, cols. 4-6. See also Brook, Officers and
Directors Liability Insurance, 2 ABA INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COIPENSATION LAW
SFenroN 228 (1967). And compare the full-page spread on page 9 of the same newspaper's
issue of March 6, 1968, in which a sullen stockholder announces that he "might just sue
every company director reading this newspaper," and reminds the presumably panicking
directors that he is but one of their "24 million potential enemies.'
3. E.g., Sylvia Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Swearingen, 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(dismissing stockholder's complaint for failure to join indispensable parties; dictum that
stockholder did not state a derivative cause of action in charging directors with having
financed European operations by borrowings in Europe at interest rate higher than those
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
The real or imagined perils faced by directors have naturally stim-
ulated their lawyers and the legislatures of most major states of in-
corporation to devise remedies. These take the form of by-laws and
statutes authorizing indemnification of corporate executives under
certain circumstances.4 With a few honorable exceptions, the object
of the draftsmen of the first generation of by-laws seemed to be vir-
tually to immunize management from personal liability. The most
brazen of these older by-laws purported to permit executives adjudged
guilty of breaching their duty to the corporation to be indemnified
not only for their counsel fees but also for the very sums they had
been ordered to pay the corporation. The recent trend among sophis-
ticated counsel has been to eschew such naively hoggish attempts to
nullify the stockholder's judicial remedy, which courts would in any
case be likely to invalidate as against public policy. But though the
newer by-laws flatly prohibit indemnification for amounts paid to the
corporation, whether pursuant to judgment or settlement, reimburse-
ment for other expenses is categorically banned only when the exec-
utive is actually adjudged derelict in his duties. Even the most self-
denying of them permit indemnification for counsel fees and other
expenses of settling a derivative suit if "independent legal counsel"
opines that the executive acted "in good faith for a purpose which
he reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation."5
Moreover, General Motors' by-law is the only one of which I am aware
charged by American lenders, apparently for the patriotic purpose of checking the gold
drain); Graham v. A~lis-Chlmers Mfg. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 335, 182 A.2d 328 (CL Ch. 1962),
aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. CL 1963) (holding that plaintiff stockholder had
failed to show that directors who did not detect employees' violation of the antitrust
laws had not exercised due care in the circumstances). Similar to the Sylvia Martin suit
is a recently reported stockholder's suit in the right of United States Steel, -which charges
its directors with excessive and improper corporate good citizenship in paying taxes which
were not legally due because nonpayment would have had an adverse effect on local tax
structures. Wail Street Journal, Jan. 2, 1968, at 19, col. 3. Still more interesting is a suit
threatened by the trustee in reorganization of 'Webb & Knapp, an insolvent real estate
corporation. According to newspaper reports, the trustee charges the directors (who in.
dude the dean of a famous law school) with negligent failure to supervise the activities
of the company's dominant manager. Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, April 20, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
4. See generally G. IVAsmGroNrO & J. BisHOP, INmrW'DEFNYG TIM ConrorATE ExEcuTivE
112-205 (1963), According to Bacon, 87 per cent of a group of several hundred manu-
facturing corporations and 77 per cent of a slightly smaller group of non.manufacturers
had made provision (usually in their by-laws) for indemnification. J. BAco., supra note 1,
at 123.
5. Freeport Sulphur Company (Proxy Statement, March 14, 195), General Motors(Proxy Statement, April 13, 1967) and Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Proxy State-
ment, February 28, 1967) are examples of corporations which have recently replaced prim.
itive indemnification by-laws with provisions which are both more artistically drafted
and more consonant with good policy. All contain provisions essentially similar to those
quoted in the text.
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The Yale Law Journal
that provides that stockholders must be informed of indemnification
payments.
Thus these new and improved provisions offer less protection
against unjustifiable indemnification of guilty insiders who elect to
settle derivative suits than do the statutes-unfortunately exceptional
-- which permit indemnification only with court approval.0 The prin-
cipal uncertainty is the independence of "independent legal counsel."
No one need question the honesty of these darlings of corporate drafts-
men: the problem rather is that those who choose them are pretty sure
to favor a lawyer who has acquired in the course of a corporate prac-
tice a sympathetic understanding of the problems of corporate man-
agement. It is not easy for even a lawyer of the most rugged integrity
to be harsh to people who were responsible for his retainer. But in
fact counsel may well be a regular associate and friend of the defen-
dants: "independent" may turn out to mean nothing more than he
is not an employee of the corporation.7 Whether truly "independent"
or not, if counsel finds the defendant executives acted "in good faith,"
etc., the corporation can pay their counsel fees-which may be sub-
stantially larger than the amount they pay the corporation in settle-
ment of its claim, especially if the corporation has agreed to pay a
satisfactory fee to plaintiff's counsel as part of the settlement.
The "independent counsel" feature of modern by-laws is probably
modeled on a similar provision of the New York Business Corporation
Law.8 But that statute, in addition to requiring judicial approval of
the settlement itself, and permitting the court's approval to limit in-
demnification in connection with the settlement,9 categorically pro-
hibits indemnification not only for amounts paid to the corporation
in settlement but also for "expenses incurred in defending a threatened
action, or a pending action which is settled or otherwise disposed of
without court approval."' 10 Such thoroughgoing insistence upon court
6. E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 830(a) (West Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 833-20
(Supp. 1966). The Connecticut statute permits indemnification without court approval If
the director's defense has succeeded on the merits. But New York's statute, the other
principal example of a legislative effort to restrict indemnification to insiders who deserve
it, permits the corporation to pay a director's counsel fees incident to settlement of a
derivative suit if the settlement itself had court approval, if that approval does not bar
indemnification, and if "directors who are not parties to such action," "independent legal
counsel," or the shareholders find that the defendant director did not breach his duty to
the corporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 722, 724, 726(b)(3) (McKinney 1963).
7. It may not even mean this much. The Westinghouse by-law, supra note 5, provides
that he may be "regular counsel of the Corporation." It is not clear whether this phrase
is intended to include house counsel.
8. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 724(b)(3) (McKinney 1963).
9. Id. § 726(b)(3).
10. Id. § 722(b).
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
supervision lessens the risk that the plaintiff stockholder and defen-
dant director will agree upon a settlement which includes a small pay-
ment by the defendant to the corporation and a large one by the
corporation to plaintiff's counsel."
The statutory current, unlike that of the by-laws, seems to have
set in the direction of greater permissiveness. The objective of the
1967 revision of the Delaware statute on indemnification2 is appar-
ently not to place limits on the protection of guilty management, but
to make explicit the power of management to indemnify itself in sit-
uations where, under the original artless enactment of an untutored
legislature, courts and commentators had questioned the propriety of
indemnification. The new Delaware statute deserves careful study, for
it is likely to prove a prototype. Indeed, its draftsmen collaborated
with those redrafting the indemnification provision of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act,'3 with the result that the two provisions are now
virtually identical. Those jurisdictions which habitually follow the
lead of Delaware and the Model Act 4 will thus face no difficult choice
of how best to demonstrate their traditional friendship for corporate
management.
The old Delaware statute'5 and those acts which copied it contained
a number of ambiguities which the courts might have resolved against
indemnification. For example, the old law did not clearly permit re-
imbursement for counsel fees incurred in contexts other than litiga-
tion; the 1967 statute is expressly applicable to "administrative or
investigative proceedings." Similarly, by making no distinction be-
tween stockholders' suits in the corporation's right and third party
suits, the old statute seemed to forbid indemnification not only when
11. Rule 23 of the Rules of the Delaware Court of Chancery, like Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibits dismissal or settlement of derivative suits without
the approval of the court; it has, however, no application to suits which are threatened
but not actually filed. No doubt the desirability of making a settlement res judicata
against the corporation, to bar revival of the daim by a stockholder not a part), to the
settlement, puts the parties under some pressure to obtain judidal approval of an) com-
promise. But since there is no explidt requirement of court approval of any indemnifica-
tion in connection with the settlement of a suit, even if actually filed, the Delauare Rules
may permit some abuse of the by-laws allowing indemnification for attorney's fees with
the approval of "independent counsel."
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1967). The new indemnification provision is
part of a broad revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See generally Ardht
& Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus. Lw.
75 (1967).
13. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 4A (1967), replacing former section 4(o).
14. See Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors,
Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAw. 95, 107-09 (1967).
15. Dar.. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953). It was analyzed at some length in G. WASH-
INGTON & J. BisHoP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXEcUTIVE 116-86 (1963).
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The Yale Law Journal
the executive was adjudged liable to the corporation for a breach of
duty to it, but also when he was adjudged liable to an outsider for an
injury committed within the scope of his duty to the corporation and
with intent to further its interests; the new provision allows indem-
nification of an executive in such circumstances "if he acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any crim-
inal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his con-
duct was unlawful."10 Moreover, even if he is adjudged liable to the
corporation for negligence or misconduct, the court is empowered to
sanction indemnification if it thinks him equitably deserving.17 Under
the old provision there was serious doubt whether even innocent in-
siders could be indemnified for expenses in suits (particularly under
Sections 10(b) and 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193418)
based on trading in their corporation's securities. Although the in-
siders' asserted liability rested on their status as directors and officers,
they had been trading on their own account, without intent to help
or harm the corporation. According to the draftsmen of the new sec-
tion, the authority to indemnify one who acted in a manner "not
opposed to" the company's interests was intended to cover just such
cases.10 Also, the executive had no right to be indemnified under the
old statute and might be in trouble if control changed or he fell out
with incumbent management. Subsection (c) of the new section pro-
vides that he "shall" be indemnified to the extent that his defense is
successful, on the merits or otherwise.
The ambiguity most disturbing to management, however, lay in
the failure of the original statute to deal explicitly with compromise
settlements. It may be conjectured with some confidence that a stock-
holder's complaint is far more likely to be settled by some sort of
compromise than to proceed to an adjudication of liability-if only
because all the statutes and most by-laws explicitly forbid indemni.
16. § 145(a). Except for the addition of the words "or not opposed to," the clause
parallels § 723(a) of the New York Business Corporation Law.
17. § 145(b). The clause is derived from a similar provision of the English Companies
Act. See p. 1102 infra.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78p(b) (1964).
19. S. AE5HT & W. STAPLEToN, ANALYSiS op THE Nzw DEAWARE Co PoATIoN LAW 327
(1967); Sebring, supra note 14, at 102. But in their article in The Business Lawyer the
Delaware draftsmen, suggesting that the purpose of the phrase was to allow indemnifica.
tion of the director who successfully defended himself against charges of having appro.
priated for himself a corporate business opportunity, were rather conspicuously silent on
management's power to use corporate assets to pay the counsel fees of an insider who
prevails in litigation based on his trading, for his own account, in the company's stock,
Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 12, at 79.
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
fication of an insider who has actually been "'adjudged" guilty of neg-
ligence or misconduct. Suppose, then, that an insider, aware that the
court is likely to take a dim view of his conduct if matters are allowed
to proceed that far, prudently elects to compromise. While continuing
to protest his innocence, he agrees to pay something to the corpora-
tion, which in turn agrees to recognize its indebtedness to plaintiff's
counsel by paying him a substantial fee. Can the corporation pay the
defendant's counsel fees, which may considerably exceed the damages
he agreed to pay? In 1962 Delaware's Chancellor, troubled by "the
unhealthy consequence of placing a director in the position where
he would be assured of indemnification if he settled but would run
the risk of paying his own attorney if he unsuccessfully resisted the
action," questioned the applicability of the statute to defendants who
settled derivative suits prior to judgment; he suggested legislative
study of the problem. 0 Predictably, the result of Delaware's legislative
study is explicit authority to indemnify a director "against expenses
(including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him
in connection with the defense or settlement of such action," if fellow
directors who are not themselves parties, or stockholders (apparently
including those who are themselves defendants), or our old friend, in-
dependent legal counsel, find that "he acted in good faith and in a
manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation." 2' In many derivative suits, of course,
all of the directors will be named as defendants, so that management
will have to choose between stockholders or independent legal coun-
sel. It seems likely that management of a publicly-held corporation
would prefer the latter alternative, which entails no problem of em-
barrassing disclosure. The new Delaware statute, unlike that of New
York, neither requires nor permits the court to require that stock-
holders be notified of indemnification payments in connection with
a settlement. In fact, as the reader will not be surprised to learn, the
new statute contains no requirement of judicial approval of indem-
nification in connection with a settlement.
On its face the word "expenses" might seem broad enough to au-
thorize reimbursement to the defendant of even the amount paid by
him to the corporation in settlement of its claim against him; the
20. Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 351, 357, 182 A.2d
647, 655-56 (Ct. Ch. 1962). The actual holding was that a corporation might elect, through
a by-law, to limit whatever freedom the statute gave it and that the corporation in ques.
tion, whose by-law excluded indemnification in case of compromise, had done so.
21. Dsi.. CoDE ANN. it. 8, § 145(b), (d).
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The Yale Law Journal
draftsmen of the earlier version of the Model Act's indemnification pro-
vision actually did so construe the term,22 although it does not appear
that any court has ever done so. But the draftsmen of the new pro-
visions of both the Delaware statute and the Model Act unequivocally
disclaim any such intention,23 and it is highly unlikely that any court
would arrive at a different construction. It is interesting to note that
the Delaware draftsmen decided against permitting the corporation
to return sums paid to it in satisfaction of judgment or settlement
of its claim not merely because such indemnification would "subvert
the substantive provisions of the corporation law," but also because
"it was the committee's view that to permit such indemnification
would have the ultimate effect of discouraging settlements since, in
such a situation, derivative plaintiffs could demonstrate no benefit
arising to the corporation from their action and, presumably, could
not justify being reimbursed for their litigation expenses, including
counsel fees." 24 The implication of this latter practical consideration
seems to be that the statute contemplates amicable settlements of
Delaware litigation, with the corporation scattering largesse among
the legal dramatis personae. This would be of a piece with Delaware's
general approach to stockholder litigation, which is to make it easy
to sue the executives of Delaware corporations, no matter where they
reside or the corporation does business, so long as the suit is in Dela-
ware courts, and conducted by Delaware counsel.25 The new legisla.
tion breaks nobody's ricebowl.
Overall, by relying too heavily on the independence of the inde-
pendent legal counsel who is to decide on indemnification in case of
settlement, the Delaware statute may betray a less than ironhearted
determination to protect the corporation. That aside, these sections
22. See 1 MODEL BuS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 4(o), 4.03 (1960); Folk, CorporatLion Statutes:
1959-1966, 1966 Ducn L.J. 875, 912.
23. See Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 12, at 79-80; Sebring, supra note 14, at 103. Scc.
don 145(a), dealing with third party suits, authorizes indemnification against "expenses
(including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and
reasonably incurred by [the defendant director] in connection with such action.... The
draftsmanship is awkward, but it does suggest that "expenses," as the word Is used In
subsection (b), covering derivative suits, is not intended to include amounts paid in settle-
ment.
24. Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 12, at 80.
25. The Delaware legislature made no change in Sections 365 and 366 of Title 10 of
the Delaware Code, whose effect is to permit the sequestration of any stock owned by a
defendant, no matter where he happens to reside, and thus to force out-of-state directors
to appear in Delaware courts. Cf. Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117
A.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Greene v. Johnston, 34 Del. Ch. 115, 99 A-2d 627 (Sup. Ct, 1953).
Moreover, the new statute, like the old, contains no requirement that the plantilf in a
derivative suit post security for the counsel fees and other expenses of successful defen.
dants.
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
of the act arguably restrain management's power to free itself from
liability for breaches of duty to the corporation as far as is possible
without direct judicial power to supervise indemnification. But the
last two subsections, (f) and (g), of Section 145 of the Delaware Law,
as well as Section 4A of the Model Act, throw everything back into
confusion. They suggest a legislative intent to permit indemnification,
directly or through insurance paid for by the corporation, in any and all
circumstances.
Subsection (f) retains without important change the non-exclusive
clause of the old Delaware statute: "The indemnification provided by
this section shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which
those indemnified may be entitled under any by-law, agreement, vote
of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise ... ." Nobody
knew what the clause meant in the old statutes, and if anyone knows
what it means in the new ones, he has not published the information.
Little, if any, light is shed by the statutes' sponsors. The Delaware
draftsmen remark cryptically that the clause was inserted "so that other
rights to indemnification may still exist by contract, by-law or charter
within such limits of public policy as the courts may establish." -0 The
principal draftsman of the Model Act's new provision expresses a be-
lief that courts will be guided by "public policy considerations, pos-
sibly in the light of the substantive provisions of the statute" in de-
ciding whether to enforce, for example, a by-law which goes beyond
the statute's scope.27 If the few cases in which the issue has been pre-
sented are any guide, the courts will not be overly eager to find in
the non-exclusive clause authority for the indemnification of exec-
utives who have breached their duty to the corporation.28
26. Arsht 8: Stapleton, supra note 12, at 80. The mention of rights of indemnification
pursuant to contract is probably intended to cover situations in which a guilty director
is in a position to offer the corporation a substantial quid pro quo in exchange for its
promise to indemnify him. Cf. Koster v. Warren, 176 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1959), aff'd,
297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding valid a promise to indemnify a director, co-defen-
dant with the corporation in criminal antitrust proceedings, in exchange for his agree-
ment to switch his plea from not guilty to nolo contendere, thereby facilitating the cor-
poration's obtaining a favorable consent decree); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179
Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589
(1944) (similar facts and holding). In neither of these cases did the original liti~ation
charge the directors with a breach of duty to the corporation. Even so, indemnification in
such cases can be criticized as tending to frustrate the policy of the antitrust laws. See
Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Anti.
trust Legislation, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1403 (1963).
27. Sebring, supra note 14, at 105.
28. See, e.g., Teren v. Howard, 522 F-2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Continental Growth
Fund, CCH FiE. SEcuarrIs L. REP. 1 91,437, at 94,719 (S.D.N.Y. 196-4); Essential Enter-
prises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (Ct. Ch. 1962). In the Teren
and Dorsey cases, the courts simply ignored the possibility that the directors' resolution to
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Subsection (f) may be a manifestation of reluctance to meddle with
the incomprehensible rather than a deliberate effort to geld the stat-
ute. Subsection (g) presents a greater threat. It deals with an aspect
of-or, as some might have it, an answer to-the indemnification
problem that could without careful legislative and judicial attention
render all but nugatory any efforts to place limits on indemnification.
The problem is insurance; specifically, the nature of the risks against
which the corporation may purchase protection for its officers and
directors. Subsection (g) at first blush (and it is certainly entitled to
blush) appears to permit the executives of a corporation to relieve
themselves at the company's expense of any legal obligation to man-
age the corporation's affairs with either honesty (provided only that
they steer clear of the penal code) or diligence. It provides, with com-
mendable candor, that
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insur-
ance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation, . . . against any liability
asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity,
or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corpora-
tion would have the power to indemnify him against such liabil-
ity under the provisions of this section.29
Delaware (and the Model Business Corporation Act) thus essay to
lay at rest, by one grand, Napoleonic stroke, all the doubts about the
propriety and validity of directors' and officers' liability insurance
which have been expressed since the introduction of such insurance. 80
Taken literally, the subsection seems to mean that, as far as the Dela-
ware lawgiver is concerned, a corporation may insure its management
against any obligation to account to the corporation for profits from
any of the numerous varieties of self-dealing, from usurping the cor-
poration's business opportunities through paying themselves excessive
indemnify themselves might be valid under the Delaware statute's non-exclusivc clause.
In Continental Growth, where a charter provision authorized the indemnification of a
director guilty of ordinary negligence in managing the corporation's affairs, the court
pointed out that the non-exclusive clause of the Maryland statute, like that of Delaware,
saved rights "under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise" but sald
nothing about charter provisions. However unconvincing the court's exegesis, it exem-
plifies the attitude which judges may be expected to display when asked to sanction tha
indemnification of directors whose innocence Is doubtful.
29. It is not clear why the subsection speaks only of "liability," making no reference
to the "expenses (including attorneys' fees)" which are specified in preceding subsectiong.
I incline to the belief that the omission was inadvertent. But it may be that "liability"
is intended to include the insider's obligation to pay his lawyer.
80. See note 1 supra.
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
compensation to plain embezzlement, which stockholders typically al-
lege in derivative suits.31
Despite the apparent blessing of the Delaware legislature, I would
hesitate to render an unhedged opinion that even the courts of Dela-
ware would treat as consistent with public policy, valid, and enforce-
able, an insurance policy paid for by the corporation whose effect was
to free corporate managers from the fear of civil liability for breach
of their duty to show good faith in their dealings with the corpora-
tion. Since none but the crudest breaches of the executive's duty of
good faith are likely to incur criminal sanctions, the principal legal
deterrent to the common varieties of self-dealing is probably fear of
civil liability.32 Where the criminal law takes adequate care of deter-
rence, so that the main effect of insurance is to assure the compensation
of the victim, the argument against allowing either the corporation or
the executive himself to purchase insurance against such liability may
lose some of its force;as nobody has ever suggested that the familiar
fidelity bond is contrary to public policy because it may weaken the
effect of civil liability as a deterrent to embezzlement. But when delib-
erate misfeasance does not violate any criminal statute, so that deter-
rence is a major reason for the imposition of civil liability, the threat
of such liability-as blunt an instrument as it is--appears to play an
essential role.34
The problem of determining what insurance protection the corpora-
tion should be allowed to purchase for its executives is, as the preceding
paragraph shows, entwined with the broader problem of what insurance
coverage should be available for purchase by either the corporation or
the executive. It is unlikely that insurance companies are anxious to
31. For an exhaustive catalogue and thorough discussion of the principal types of
conflict of interest between directors and corporations, see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 57-73 (1966).
32. For such reasons it has been suggested that any insurance against civil liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty is contrary to public policy, even if it is paid for by the
director himself. See Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 CoLum.
L REv. 716, 719 (1967). Cf. Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by
Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1408-09 (1963).
33. Some courts have upheld insurance which covered civil liability for riminal acts,
such as assault and battery. E.g., Wolff v. General Cas. Co. of America, 68 N.. 292, 361
P.2d 330 (1961); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1954).
See Comment, Liability Insurance and Assault and Battery: Coverage and Damages Prob-
lems, 50 CoRaniL L.Q. 506 (1965); E. PATr.oN, ESsENTIAs oF I.stURANCE .AvW 69, 263-66(2d ed. 1957).
34. E.g., Northwestern Cas. Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 435 Oth Cir. 1962) (re-
fusing to construe a liability insurance policy as covering punitive damages, since such
coverage would be against public policy and invalid); American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F."d
523 (loth Cir. 1966) (similar holding); see E. PATrEPSN, supra note 83, at 20.-6. But cf.
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (196).
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guarantee the success of managerial attempts to divert corporate assets
to management's own pockets, even by methods short of larceny, any
more than they would wish to insure an ordinary thief against having to
return to the owner the fruits of his larcenous labors-if only because
insurance which in effect encouraged the act against whose consequences
it insured would be unlikely to be profitable6 Indeed, the present
standard form30 appears to intend to exclude such coverage, so far as it
is possible to discern intent through the smog of its peculiar draftsman.
ship. Part I of the policy, which reimburses the corporation for in-
demnification payments made by it, covers only payments "required or
permitted according to applicable law, or under provisions of the
Company's charter or by-laws." Not even the Delaware statute seems to
permit the corporation to indemnify against liabilities arising out of
self-enrichment, and, despite the non-exclusive clause, it is unlikely that
the courts would treat as valid a charter or by-law provision which
purported to go beyond the statute.37
But part II of the policy, which insures the individual director or
officer against liabilities and expenses for which the corporation cannot
lawfully indemnify him, might well be held to cover several kinds of
self-dealing. Its exclusion clause provides inter alia that
Underwriters shall not be liable to make any payment for loss in
connection with any claim made against the Assureds:
(b) based upon or attributable to their gaining in fact any
personal profit or advantage to which they were not legally
entitled;
(c) for the return by the Assureds of any remuneration paid to
the Assureds without the previous approval of the stockholders
of the company which payment without such previous approval
shall be held by the courts to have been illegal;
(e) brought about or contributed to by the dishonesty of the
Assureds; however, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Assureds
shall be protected under the terms of this policy as to any claims
upon which suit may be brought against them, by reason of any
alleged dishonesty on the part of the Assureds, unless a judg-
35. See Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 COLUt. L, REV. 710,
717 (1967).
36. The form currently most in use is the "Stewart, Smith" (or American) variety of
the Lloyd's of London Directors and Officers (Open Market) Form, which Is described
in Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HArV. L. Rrv. 648 (1067). Changeg
in the drafting and coverage of the policies have been frequent since their introduction
about five years ago, but there is considerable room for improvement. I believe, but cannot
guarantee, that the forms available to me are the most advanced.
37. See p. 1085 supra.
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ment or other final adjudication thereof adverse to the Assureds
shall establish that acts of active and deliberate dishonesty
committed by the Assureds with actual dishonest purpose and
intent were material to the cause of action so adjudicated; ...
When the reader's head stops spinning, he can begin to sort out the
questions which throng into his mind. Is there a difference between a
director's gaining a profit to which he is not legally entitled and "dis-
honesty"? Is excessive compensation an advantage to which an officer
is not legally entitled? If it is, why is it excluded only when the reason
for its illegality is the absence of stockholder approval-which is very
rarely a reason for holding compensation excessive?3s If a court directed
the return of remuneration for the usual reason, which is that it bore
no reasonable relation to the value of the services rendered, "9 the
insurer would presumably be obligated to pay to the executive a sum
equal to the amount by which his wages exceeded his worth-a pre-
posterous result which it is highly unlikely that the draftsman of the
policy intended. (Another version of the form, which may be later in
date, excludes "salaries of officers or employees of the Company" from
the definition of "loss." This would still reimburse an officer for the
expenses of his unsuccessful defense; moreover, it might have no appli-
cation to one to whom excessive remuneration was paid for his services
as a director.)
Worse confusion follows. Is "active and deliberate" dishonesty worse
than common, unadorned dishonesty, or than passive and inadvertent
dishonesty? What happens if the Assured elects to settle a claim based
upon dishonesty before it ripens into a judgment or other (what other?)
final adjudication adverse to him?
These are merely the most glaring of the ambiguities which make the
coverage of the policy so hard to figure out: the legal reader will doubt-
less find many more for himself. As noted, it seems improbable that
these exclusions from the exclusions are intentional, and it may be
supposed that at least the most absurd of them will be eliminated under
the combined pressures of competition and corporate counsel who
cannot, in the present condition of the policy, tell their clients what
sort of pig is in the poke which they are invited to purchase. After all,
58. As a general proposition, the board of directors is legally free to set the compensa-
tion of executives without a stockholder vote, unless ('m a few jurisdictions) the compen-
sation takes the form of stock or options to purchase stock. E.g., N.Y. BTus. Corp. LAw§ 505(d) OfcKinney 1963); see generally 1 G. 1VAsiiwcroi & V. Rao.souwL, Comtmwam'
THE CorpopR- ExExcvm 225-28 (2d ed. 1962).
39. 1 G. WASHUGTON & V. RoTHscHLLD, supra note 88, at 203 et seq.
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in three short years the draftsmanship of the Lloyd's standard form
(and its American imitators) has progressed from the grotesque" to the
merely inept, and there is no reason to suppose that the underwriters'
counsel have come to the end of their ability to learn. It is safe to as-
sume that sooner or later the policy will exclude from its coverage situa-
tions in which the executive is liable (whether via settlement or adjudi-
cation) to the corporation for any form of self-enrichment at the
expense of the corporation.
But while time and insurers' self-interest may tighten the definition
of the risks covered in part II of the standard form, the present policy
appears to cover liability for a variety of self-enriching acts by execu-
tives, for which the corporation could not lawfully indemnify them. As a
concession to the reasoning that the corporation should not be permit.
ted to purchase insurance against liability for which it could not
directly indemnify the director, the common practice has been for the
corporation to pay 90 per cent of the total premium and the director
the remaining 10 per cent.41 The theory behind this happy arrangement
is that the corporation's share of the premium represents the cost of
coverage under part I, against liability for which the corporation could
properly indemnify the director, while the director's contribution pays
for the protection under part II against non-indemnifiable risks. The
difficulty with the theory, as I have pointed out before,42 is that it bears
small relation to reality. As the standard form is now drafted, it seems
probable that far more than 10 per cent of the total coverage represents
risks against which the corporation could not properly indemnify its
executives, even under the new Delaware statute.43
The standard reply to this criticism has been the argument that
there is a basic difference between direct indemnification and insurance;
40. The paleolithic policies are described in Bishop, supra note 1, at 103.00.
41. The argument is that if the risk insured against by part -i.e., that part of tile
risk which consists of liability and expense for which the corporation could not lawfully
indemnify the director-is greater than 10 per cent, then the corporation is attempting
to do indirectly what it could not do directly. New York's Business Corporation Law ex-
plicitly invalidates any provision for indemnification which is inconsistent with the statute.
N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAw § 721 (McKinney 1963). California's statute is similar. CAL. Coiu'.
CODE § 830(e) (West 1955).
It is interesting to note that a number of New York corporations have recently replaccd
their pre-1963 indemnification by-laws with by-laws which provide merely that directors
and officers "shall be indemnified to the fullest extent now or hereafter permitted by
law .. " E.g., General Electric Company (Proxy Statement, March 11, 1968), Long Island
Lighting Company (Proxy Statement, March 7, 1968). Management may fear that New York
courts, like those of Delaware, would hold that discretion to indemnify could be limited
by a by-law which could be construed to be more restrictive than the statute. See supra
note 20.
42. See Bishop, supra note 1, at 106-07.
43. See pp. 1087-90 supra.
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because the latter is "compensation," it is said, the corporation may
properly pay the entire cost 4 The Delaware statute, which apparently
allows the corporation to pay 100 per cent of the premium, seems to
represent a retreat from the rationale that the 90-10 premium division
avoids the problem of insurance by the corporation for non-indemnifi-
able risks, in favor of entire reliance on the compensation theory. But
that theory itself seems wrong to me. Conceptually, any variety of in-
demnification, direct or indirect, is a form of compensation.4 But to
argue from this premise that the corporation may therefore compensate
its directors by purchasing insurance against all risks requires the tacit
assumption that any kind of "compensation" is necessarily consistent
with public policy. That assumption is patently unsound, for the courts
frequently find that this or that type of executive compensation is im-
permissible, for a variety of reasons46 It seems improbable that any
court would uphold a contract of employment which provided that the
executive should owe the corporation no duty of good faith or due
care, especially if that contract were not disclosed to stockholders. But
if such a straiglitforward attempt to avoid the responsibilities attached
to corporate office would fail, it is difficult to see why the corporation
should be allowed to achieve the same result by the device, differing
only in technique, of purchasing insurance against liability for breaches
of these duties.
The argument that the corporation should be able to purchase in-
surance as "compensation" therefore seems at best sophistical. So long
as the law imposes on directors duties of good faith and due care, it
should not permit them to evade those duties through the device of
insurance purchased by the corporation. Unless the Delaware legisla-
ture really intends to relieve directors of their traditional responsibil-
ities, the new Section 145 is simply self-contradictory. But even if the
Delaware statute forbade the corporation to buy insurance against
liabilities and expenses for which it could not indemnify, it would still
be inadequate.
First, as a practical matter, it is all but impossible to prevent the cor-
poration from buying insurance against liability for breaches of the
duty owed it by directors through the simple expedient of increasing
44. This is the reasoning adduced by the draftsmen as a justification for subsection (;)
of the Delaware statute. See Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 12, at 80. See also Note, Liability
Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HAiv. L. Rxv. 648, 669 (1967).
45. See Sorensen v. Overland Corp., 242 F.2d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 1957).
46. See 1 G. WA SAHIrON g- V. Rormsmwm, ComPEN ,LTiNG TnE CoaPoaAE ExEcinrx
232 et seq. (3d ed. 1962).
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The Yale Law Journal
their general compensation by the comparatively small amount neces-
sary to permit them to pay from their own pockets for the liability in.
surance which it simultaneously negotiates on their behalf. Second,
public policy should not permit even the executive himself to purchase
insurance against liability for those breaches of duty for which the
corporation could not indemnify him, with the possible exception of
liability for "ordinary" negligence. The need seems to be for regulation
of the coverage of the insurance available on the market, whether paid
for by the corporation or by the director himself.
Thus, where civil liability is the sole or principal legal deterrent to
self-enrichment at the corporation's expense, the director should not
be permitted to insure himself against such liability, even if he can find
an insurer willing to write such a policy. For like reasons, directors
should not be allowed to insure themselves against liability based on
negligence of a gross description, amounting to total abdication of the
responsibility imposed upon them by law.
The evil of the decoy duck director, whose main function is to give
to actual and potential public investors a false feeling of security, has
long been recognized as real and serious. 47 There seems to be a general
consensus that outside directors-i.e., directors who are not full-time
employees of the corporation-are desirable: even the New York Stock
Exchange urges "companies not having outside directors... to consider
the desirability of doing so. ' 48 A recent survey of 456 manufacturing
companies showed only six with no outside directors; nearly two-thirds
had an outside majority.49 In 1966 even Standard of New Jersey, the
leading holdout among publicly held corporations, capitulated and
nominated two outside directors, who were soon followed by two
more.50
Outside directors are thought to be desirable for a number of reasons,
including their special knowledge and experience and their connections
with other businessesrl but the principal justification for their presence,
in theory and perhaps in practice, is the expectation that they will
supervise, not to say police, the active management of the corporation
-playing in this respect a role analogous to that of the Aufsichtsrat, or
47. See, e.g., Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (1907); Douglas,
Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REV. 1305 (1934).
48. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, at B-23. See FORTUNE, July 15, 1966, at 71,
49. J. BACON, CORPORATE DntECroasnw PRAcrims 6 (National Industrial Conference
Board, 1967).
50. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 1966 Annual Report, March 9, 1967, at 6.7.
51. J. BACON, supra note 49, at 7, 14. Bankers and lawyers are particularly favored.
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Supervisory Council, of a German corporation5 2 Outside directors who
do not supervise may be dangerous in much the same way that a quack
cancer cure is dangerous; reliance upon them inhibits resort to other
and more effective remedies. The temptation to treat a directorship
as "an avocation, a luxury, a compliment paid to a successful business
or professional man, something like the bestowal of an honorary de-
gree," 53 seems to be as great today as ever. The American (and probably
world) champion director of 1966, a 76-year-old Boston banker, sat on
the boards of 43 corporations, some of them very large." He may, of
course, resemble Caesar and Napoleon in his ability to direct several
diverse operations simultaneously, but it is also possible that he does
not closely supervise all of the 43 managements. So far as I know, it is
not a crime to be a director who does not direct; at least I am not aware
that any director has ever been sent to jail for aggravated abdication of
his responsibilities. The only legal deterrent to such conduct, and
perhaps the only substantial deterrent of any sort, is the fear of civil
liability. It seems to me that the desirability of compensating the victims
of such gross directorial negligence is outweighed by the desirability of
deterring it (especially in view of the fact that the holders of multiple
directorships are often magnates rich enough to pay the damages from
their own fortunes), and that insurance against it ought to be held
contrary to public policy. Indeed, undervriters would exclude it from
coverage if they intelligently consulted their own interest, for such
negligence, amounting to an abdication of responsibility, is practically
intentional: the existence of insurance against such liability is likely
to encourage the conduct on which the liability is grounded.
There may, however, be one area where the limits which public
policy should place upon insurable risks may diverge from the limits
which should be imposed on the corporation's freedom to purchase
insurance for directors. When liability rests on no more than an
ordinarily negligent breach of duty to the corporation, the desirability
of compensating the victim would appear to outweigh the risk that the
existence of insurance will increase the frequency of the wrongful con-
duct. In negligent malpractice cases, the fact that civil liability is usually
the only legal deterrent is not regarded as a reason for preventing
52. The Aufsichtsrat, whose members are elected by the stockholders and, under the
"codetermination" provisions of the statute, by the employees, selects the Vorstand, or
active management. No member of the Aufsichtsrat may be a member of the Vorstand.
Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HAv. L.
REV. 23, 50-53 (1966).
53. Dwight, supra note 47, at 33.
54. See TrdE, Sept. 9, 1966, at 94.
1093
HeinOnline -- 77 Yale L.J. 1093 1967-1968
ti
r is ry il, i .llZ
t i t t t k
er r s; liance i its rt t t er
ti e i . ti t ir ctorship
i t i t ssful i
i al t al r ry
53 rican
i , r- ld t
, .lit
, le l it t r l
ti s t t
l i ll ts. r ' . t
t r t t; t re
t t r t tion f
i ilities. l t
i l t . il
t lit sating
l
rri g ll dl
i s
ir t ld
r . n riters l e t
tl r .










"codetermination" provisions of the statute, t l , J' t d, r
t. i ll t J' t d.




The Yale Law Journal
physicians from insuring their patients against uncompensated injury
by insuring themselves against such liability. There does not seem to be
any compelling reason to distinguish the cases involving ordinary negli-
gence on the part of corporate directors. Since the misfeasance is not
deliberate, the deterrent value of civil liability is not great enough to
require protection by such a prohibition of insurance. On the other
hand, the liability is and should be non-indemnifiable, and therefore
the corporation should not be allowed partially to relieve the director
of his duty of care by purchasing insurance.
Ideally, therefore, coverage for this risk should be severed from the
policy for which the corporation is allowed to pay, and made available
only if purchased by the director. Because of the difficulty, mentioned
earlier, of preventing the corporation from paying for such coverage
indirectly by increasing the general compensation of the director,
it seems worthwhile to examine the frequency with which liability
is imposed for such simple negligence. Perhaps the problem can be
solved by the application of the maxim, de minimis non curat lex. If
cases of this sort are sufficiently rare, as they seem to be, such Levitical
scrupulosity, merely to vindicate a principle of minimal practical im-
portance, may be more trouble than it is worth. Such a solution might,
moreover, have the great practical advantage of allaying the worries
of honest corporate managers, for it is precisely this type of liability to
which the main thrust of the insurance brokers' advertising is directed
and which is brought forward as the principal reason for legislation
authorizing the corporation to buy such insurance for its executives.t
All of the commentators, of course, recite the proposition that a
corporation's directors have a duty to conduct its affairs with diligence
and prudence.56 Many state corporation statutes contain provisions
codifying the obligation;57 their phraseology, like that employed by the
courts, is diverse and may be intended to create a variety of standards
of care.08 Whether intended to do so or not, the effect of some statutes
55. See S. AiRs W. STAPLETfON, ANALYSIS OF THE NEW DEiAwARE CORPORATION LAW
328 (1967).
56. E.g., M. FEuER, PERsoNAL LmaLITIEs or COPORATE DmcroRS AND OrFrcen 14-23
(1961); W. FLETcama, CORPORATIONS §§ 989-1100 (perm. ed.); H. HENN, CORPORATON3 § 235
(1961); 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRAcTICE § 446 (1959); Dyson, The Director's
Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L. REv. 341 (1965); Nielsen, Directors' Duties under Anglo.
American Corporation Law, 43 U. DEr. L.J. 605, 609 (1966).
57. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRnP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408
(1953). See also Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors,
20 Bus LAW. 817 (1965), which discusses inter alia the varying statutory standards of care
in particular situations, such as the declaration of dividends.
58. See Dyson, supra note 56, which catalogues in some detail the verbal formulae em-
ployed by courts and legislatures. Professor Dyson concludes that all leave too much leeway
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
may in fact be to increase or lessen the quantum of diligence expected of
a director. For example, the draftsmen's notes to Section 717 of the New
York Business Corporation Law, which prescribes "that degree of
diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
in similar circumstances in like positions," suggest a purpose to dis-
tinguish between inside and outside directors.50 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently declared that Section 1408
of that Commonvealth's Business Corporation Law, which requires of
directors of business corporations "that diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise in similar circumstances in
their personal business affairs,"GO has transformed Pennsylvania's easy-
going common law standard into one which "is harsh and strict and...
may well render unattractive positions as directors of business corpora-
tions." 61
But whatever terror these legislative and judicial menaces may strike
into the hearts of directors is probably unjustified. The hard fact is that
cases in which directors of business corporations are held liable, at the
suit of stockholders, for mere negligence are few and far between. As an
uncommonly frank judge put it, "it is only in a most unusual and
extraordinary case that directors are held liable for negligence in the
absence of fraud, or improper motive, or personal interest."62 The
observation was made 20-odd years ago but is still valid. The ado about
the liability of directors for mere negligence is like the proverbial
shaving of pigs--much squeal and little wool, at least for the stock-
holders.
Most of the cases usually cited as examples of director's liability for
negligence fall into a special category not at all typical of modem
American corp6rate life. Such cases involved banks or, occasionally,
other monied corporations such as investment companies; the bank was
generally insolvent, so that whatever was recovered would probably
benefit depositors (a class of creditors for whom in the days before the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation the courts displayed particular
for construction and application to be of much practical use as guides to managerial
conduct.
59. N.Y. JoINT LrEisLArsv' CoMIr. To STUDY RVISIo N OF CoRtP. Lmws, MI s SUPPLE-
MiNT TO F= IrIN-rH REPORT TO 1961 SESSION or NEw YoRan STATE LxcLsLATUmr, Lro.
Doc. No. 12, at 5 (1961).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (1953) (emphasis added).
61. Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 578, 224 A2d 634, 643 (1966).
But the court's strictures were only dicta, for it concluded that the defendant directors
would have been liable even under the common law test.
62. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.YS.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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solicitude) rather than stockholders; 3 the negligence of the directors,
which generally took the form of supinely allowing dishonest managers
to play ducks and drakes with the depositors' money, could be charac-
terized by such pejoratives as "gross" or an "utter abdication of. . .
common-law responsibility";6 4 and the directors themselves usually
furnished the occasion for rhetoric yet more colorful-they were "mere
figureheads,"65 or "gilded ornaments of the institution, to.. . be used
as a lure to customers,"6 6 or guilty of regarding a directorship as "a
mere position of honor void of responsibility."6 r
As early as 1742 the Stammvater of this line of cases, The Charitable
Corporation v. Sutton,6 8 already exhibited most of the breed's distinctive
traits. The Charitable Corporation was a sort of eleemosynary hock-
shop, whose object was "to assist poor persons with sums of money by
way of loan, to prevent them falling into the hands of pawnbrokers."
Its 50-odd committeemen (i.e., directors) were men of substance and
good repute, but only five of them actively interested themselves in its
affairs. The activities of the five took the form of causing the corpora-
tion's funds to be lent to themselves and their accomplices upon inade-
quate or fictitious collateral. "The loss," said Lord Chancellor Hard-
wicke, obviously greatly impressed, "is prodigious, for ... the money
lent was 385,000, whereas the value of the goods pledged was not more
than 135,000 ..... ,9 He held that the directors who were not privy to
the swindle were guilty of "crassa negligentia," in essence because of
their total failure to check up on the active management,"0 and held
63. Some courts for this reason said that bank directors were to be held to an ex-
ceptionally high standard of diligence. See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888
(6th Cir. 1938); Pirott v. Heinen, 137 Kan. 186, 192, 19 P.2d 723, 727 (1933); Greenfield Say,
Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. 252, 255, 97 N.E. 897, 899-900 (1912); Broderick v. Marcus,
152 Misc. 413, 418, 272 N.Y.S. 455, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1934). In fact, whenever creditors were the
beneficiaries of a recovery from delinquent directors, the courts may have been influenced
by the old theory, now either moribund or entirely defunct, that the assets of a corpora.
tion were a "trust fund" for creditors. Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 154 (1882); Wood
v. Dummer, 30 F. Gas. 435 (No. 17,944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824); See IV. COOK, 1'IUNCIPLtS Of
CoRORATioN LAW 76 (1925). Even where the insolvent corporation was of the ordinary
industrial or mercantile kind, courts sometimes talked the language of breach of trust.
See, e.g., Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203, 206, 57 P. 1084, 1085 (1899); Folsom v. Smith, 113 Me,
83, 89, 92 A. 1003, 1006 (1915); New York Credit len's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, 805
N.Y. 1, 7, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1953).
64. Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511, 514 (1919).
65. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 297 Ill. 555, 562, 131 N.E. 103, 105 (1921).
66. Gibbons v. Anderson, 80 F. 345, 350 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1897).
67. Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 106, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918).
68. 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742). A century and a half later Mr. Justice Harlan, dissent-
ing from an opinion refusing to hold liable the dummy directors of an insolvent national
bank, described the old case as "very instructive." Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 171-72
(1891).
69. 26 Eng. Rep. at 643.
70. Id. at 644.
1096











t i li , ritable






ti ' t l t t t l t i li i -
l. ,
i , i l tl i , i i i , . t






, ); l v.





, C W. !'Rl .u J!
O POR IO w i
til
lUI .
, M ' ll
).
.s , .
l 8: . 1).
, , . . . ).
. . l , . . , , . . , ( ).
. I-Iarl , ·
i l t ti ll l
tructive:' . ·
).
Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
them liable to make good the corporation's losses: "If some persons are
guilty of gross non-attendance, and leave the management intirely to
others, they may be guilty by this means of the breaches of trust that
are committed by others."71
American courts applied the Chancellor's reasoning to do-nothing
directors of the insolvent banks whose carcasses littered the financial
landscape from the early days of the republic until well into the present
century.7 2 Even so, many a useless director escaped, for some judges
displayed what a sarcastic commentator described as "good-humored
tolerance"7 3 of rustic worthies who supposed that a seat on the board of
the village bank was not so much a job as a tribute to their standing in
the community. Probably the most notorious example of such judicial
indulgence is Briggs v. Spaulding,4 in which five justices of the Supreme
Court, considering the age, decrepitude, and inexperience of a bank's
directors, managed to find their confidence in and failure to police
the thieving president (who was, as the Chief Justice emphasized, not
only a regular churchgoer but the treasurer of the local Young Men's
Christian Association75) up to the standard of "ordinarily prudent and
diligent men ... under similar circumstances."7 0 Four Justices, led by
Harlan, dissented vigorously,77 and the decision has been much criti-
cized;78 but neither its complaisant attitude nor its result was by any
means unique.79
Some of the bank cases, of course, deviate from the pattern in more
or less minor ways. Thus, a few were brought by stockholders rather
than receivers, trustees in bankruptcy or state officials acting for the
71. Id.
72. Among the cases most frequently cited are Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920);
Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504 (1919); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891);
Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1928); Warner v.
Penoyer, 91 F. 587 (2d Cir. 1898); Gibbons v. Anderson, 80 F. 345 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1897);
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 297 M. 555, 131 N.E. 103 (1921); Percy v. Millaudon,
8 Mart. (N.S.) 68 (La. 1829) (suit by stockholders rather than a receiver). Campbell v.
Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901). contains an exhaustive survey of the nine-
teenth-century bank cases. Many of these cases were cited for viorous dicta aflrming the
directors' duty of care rather than for any imposition of actual liability. See note 79 in ra.
73. Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 YALIE L.J. 33, 38 (1907).
74. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
75. Id. at 158-59.
76. Id. at 152.
77- Id. at 166.
78. See, e.g., Dwight, supra note 73, at 37-38. Learned Hand called it "a case ...
which to-day would probably have gone the other way... !, Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614.
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
79. See, e.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Warner v. Penoyer, 91 F. 587 (2d Cir.
1898); Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895); Wallach v.
Billings, 277 Ili. 218, 115 N.E. 382 (1917), cert. denied, 244 U.S. 659 (1917); Goodwin v.
Simpson, 292 Mass. 148, 197 N.E. 628 (1935). The last two cases cannot be explained in
terms of judicial sympathy for hayseed directors entangled in the webs of high finance.
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benefit of depositors.80 In a very few cases, the negligence on which lia-
bility was predicated took a form other than abdication of the board's
duty to supervise active management, although the adjectives employed
by the courts suggest that they viewed the directors' mismanage-
ment as something worse than ordinary negligence. In Hun v. Cary,8'
the court branded the decision of the directors of a shaky bank to erect
an "imposing ediffice" in an effort to lure depositors as "improvidence"
and "reckless, unreasonable extravagance." In Litwin v. Allen,8 2 direc-
tors of the Guaranty Trust Company, which was not exactly a country
bank, in the fall of 1930 authorized a deal whereby the bank bought
convertible debentures of the Missouri Pacific Railroad from Allegheny
Corporation (then the principal holding company of the brothers Van
Sweringen), at the same time giving Allegheny an option to repurchase
them at the same price within six months. The price of the debentures
fell, and Allegheny, of course, declined to repurchase. The heads-I-win-
tails-you-lose aspect of the deal led the court to describe it as "so im.
provident, so risky, so unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to
fundamental conceptions of prudent banking practice."8 13 Although the
court said that "the honesty of the directors in this case is unques.
tioned,"84 it has been suggested that the real explanation of the decision
is that the judge, suspecting but having no proof of dishonesty, bot-
tomed liability on negligence.8 5 A more likely explanation, I think, is
that the bank, already too deeply involved in the fortunes of Allegheny,
was so reluctant to see it go under that the directors were willing to
pour in more money on almost any terms which Allegheny's manage-
ment would accept. If so, the case must still be regarded as one of the
rare examples of liability for bad judgment, albeit extraordinary bad
judgment.
It would be unprofitable to dissect further this class of cases, the
principal authorities for the proposition that directors may be held
liabl for honest negligence. The class has been virtually extinct for a
80. E.g., Wallach v. Billings, 277 I1. 218, 115 N.E. 882 (1917); Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223
N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Gallin v,
National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880, 281 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Warren v. Robison, 19
Utah 289, 57 P. 287 (1899); O'Connor v. First Natl Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 177 S.E,
852 (1935). In the Wallach and Warren cases the bank was in fact insolvent, and in
O'Connor the plaintiffs, "mostly inexperienced women," were stockholders in an invest.
ment company who could be and were analogized to bank depositors.
81. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
82. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
83. Id. at 699.
84. Id.
85. See Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 COLum. L. REV. 716,
723 (1967).
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Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks
quarter of a century, partly because of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and other New Deal reforms, and partly, no doubt, because
the trend toward fewer and larger banks has made inexperienced and
gullible bank directors scarcer than they used to be. The modem cases
which fit into the general category are comparatively few and involve
monied corporations other than banks-frequently, investment com-
panies.88
The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack. Few are the cases in which the stockholders do not
allege conflict of interest, still fewer those among them which achieve
even such partial success as denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint.87 Still, it cannot be denied that there is a small number
of relatively recent cases which do seem to lend a modicum of substance
to the fears of directors of industrial or mercantile corporations that they
may be stuck for what they like to call "mere" or "honest" negligence.
My own collection, based on extensive (although not exhaustive) investi-
gation, includes four such specimens. The oldest is Clayton v. Farish,88
holding that stockholders stated a derivative cause of action when they
charged the directors of Standard Oil of New Jersey with negligent
failure to look out for Standard's interests when, pursuant to a cartel
agreement with I. G. Farben, they agreed that Standard would give up
the chemical business which should have developed from its primary
activities in oil. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss O
86. E.g., Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1957); Neese v. Brovm,-Tenn.-
405 S.W.2d 577 (1964); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (Ct. Ch. 1961).
The outside directors whom the court in the Heit case found to have "totally abdicated
their duties" did not actually have to pay anything, for the court held them entitled to
indemnification by the self-dealing inside directors, who paid nearly a million dollars to
settle the case. See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 20, 1967, at 22, col. 4. See generally Eisenberg
S. Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation-New Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62
CoLVm. L. REV. 73 (1962); Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities
of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058 (1957).
87. Professor Dyson has examined at some length the variety of reasons which the
courts have adduced for refusal to hold directors liable for mere negligence. Prominent
among them are the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue, his failure to show causation (ie.,
that the loss would not have occurred had the director done his duty), and, of course, the
business judgment rule. Dyson, supra note 56. Recent unsuccessful efforts to hold directors
liable for mismanagement not arising from self-dealing include, in addition to the Sylvia
Martin and Graham cases mentioned note 3 supra, Warshaw v. Calhoun, - Del.
Ch. -, 221 A.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1966) and Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 325, 229 N.Y.S.d 11 (19'2)
(reversing Supreme Court's holding (197 N.Y.S.2d 623) that the defendant directors were
liable for causing the corporation to incur heavy expenses incident to an abortive acquisi-
tion which they should have known was invalid).
88. 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
89. 305 N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.2d 397 (1953).
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held that directors who sold the assets of a liquidating corporation at
public auction without adequate notice to either creditors or the public
would be liable to its trustee in bankruptcy under a statute obligating
directors to pay to the corporation or its creditors the value of property
"lost, or wasted, by or through any neglect of or failure to perform or
other violation of their duties,"90 unless they could show that they had
in fact realized as high a price as was possible in the circumstances.
Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse1 held that a stock-
holder stated a cause of action in charging directors, under the same
statute, with wasting assets by paying excessive salaries to employees
(not including themselves) and allowing the employees to engage in
sundry forms of petty graft at the corporation's expense. Finally,
Selheimer v. Manganese Corporation of America92 seems actually to
have held directors liable in a derivative suit for "gross mismanage-
ment" which led to the company's insolvency.
But to my mind none of these cases carries real conviction. Clayton
and Channel 9 held no more than that the allegations stated a cause of
action: the plaintiffs had still to hurdle all the obstacles to actual re-
covery in such a suit. 3 In Channel 9, indeed, the court could hardly
have dismissed the complaint, since it was cast in the terms of the
statute. In Weiss, we do not know whether the directors ever had to pay
anything; on remand they may have convinced the trial court that the
company's assets would have fetched no more money in a better-adver-
tised sale. Moreover, Weiss must be regarded as a sport; there was a
cogent dissent,94 and it does not seem to have been followed in any sub.
sequent decision of the New York courts.05 On its face, Selheimer un-
doubtedly holds directors liable for failing to discharge their duties
"with that diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in their personal business affairs."
But the facts are heavy with the odor of self-dealing. The judge of the
Court of Common Pleas who originally heard the case, sitting as chan.
cellor, found "wilful misconduct and a pattern of self-enrichment by
the managing defendants." Though a majority of the court en banc
90. N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 60(2) (McKinney 1943). The provision was substantially re-
enacted in § 720(a)(1)(B) of the N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW (McKinney 1963).
91. 51 Misc. 2d 188, 273 N.YS.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
92. 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). See p. 1095 supra.
93. See note 87 supra.
94. By Desmond and Fuld, JJ., 805 N.Y. at 11, 110 N.E.2d at 400.
95. One case distinguished it on the ground that it was limited to situations in which
the directors intended to wind up the business. Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.8,2d 248, 261
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
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disagreed and found no "fraud, self-dealing or personal profit gained,"
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared obiter that the record fully
supported the chancellor's findingsY0 The decision seems to be one of
those in which "negligence" is a euphemism for dishonesty.07 All in all,
I remain very skeptical of the proposition that directors of industrial
corporations run any substantial risk of liability for ordinary negli-
gence. There is, in fact, little precedent for liability even for the kind
of Merovingian supineness for which directors were held liable in ie
old bank casesY8
Therefore, if part II of the standard insurance policy were redrafted
to cover only liability for ordinary negligence, I would feel that 10 per
cent, or perhaps even one per cent, of the total premium would repre-
sent a more than fair assessment of the incidence of the risk, at least in
the case of the ordinary industrial or mercantile corporation. In my
opinion the cases in which a director is adjudged liable, or compelled
to settle, a derivative suit based on nothing worse than ordinary negli-
gence do not amount to one in a hundred. Such a redrafting of the
standard form would properly allow the corporation to pay so large a
share of the premium that there seems no practical reason to prevent it
from paying the entire cost.
Such an arrangement would allow insurance, whether paid for by
the corporation or the director, only against indemnifiable risks and
ordinary negligence. It may be suggested that there are such things as
breaches of the director's duty of good faith and loyalty which are
morally innocent, and that it ought to be possible to protect directors
against liability to the corporation for such breaches. It is true that in
recent decades the courts have tended to expand the duty of loyalty
by condemning varieties of self-dealing which previously had been re-
96. 423 Pa. at 584-85, 224 A.2d at 646.
97. Cf. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). It should be noted that in
Clayton v. Farish the complaint alleged not only negligence but also that the defendant
directors had received substantial personal benefits as the price of selling out Standard.
191 Misc. at 161, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
98. Perhaps mention should also be made of another type of directors' liability which
cannot neatly be classified as a breach of either the duty of good faith or that of due care.
These are the cases in which the plaintiff stockholder charges directors with excessive and
imprudent zeal in their efforts to maximize the corporate profits, typically by violating the
antitrust laws. Eg., Knopfler v. Bohlen, 15 App. Div. 2d 922, 225 N.YS.2d 609 (1962);
Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Such suits have been uncommon, in
part because the plaintiff may be faced with the difficult task of proving that crime did
not pay-i.e., that the amounts of the corporation's fines and other expenses were greater
than its illicit profits. See Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Officers for Violations of Fiduciary
Duties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 INm. I.J. 313 (1965); Recent Developments,
Pleading and Proof of Damages in Stockholders' Derivative Actions Based on Antitrust Con-
victions, 64 CoLu,. L. REV. 174 (1964).
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garded as legal and even ethical-for example the use of corporate
funds to beat off the wicked raider and preserve the jobs of the virtuous
management-and it is arguably unfair to penalize the executive who
furnishes the occasion for a jurisdiction's first decision that particular
conduct has ceased to be permissible. 0 It is not an answer to say, as
does one commentator,100 that directors should be deterred from con-
duct whose propriety is even dubious; if directors had to eschew every
conflict of interest which a judge might hold improper, the argument
that no man with substantial outside business interests would care to
become a director of a publicly held company would carry more weight
than it does at present. But insurance does not seem to be the answer
to the question. It would be hard to draft a clause precisely defining
the sort of self-dealing which is morally innocent in such a way as to
avoid leaving too much to the discretion of "disinterested" directors or
"independent" legal counsel. It would be just as hard to draw a line
between the illicit profits which even a morally innocent director
should be compelled to disgorge and the damage to the corporation
(which may be greater than the benefit to the director from the self-
dealing) 01 which he should not be compelled to pay. It is safer to leave
to the courts the relief of the morally innocent director. One device is
embodied in the British Companies Act of 1948, which provides that
If... it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer...
is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly and reason-
ably, and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case,
• . . he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default,
breach of duty or breach of trust, that court may relieve him,
either wholly or partly, from his liability on such terms as the
court may think fit.102
The new Delaware statute and the Model Act do in fact confer a
similar authority upon the court. 03 Even without ,such statutory au-
thority, a court might in such circumstances lay down the new law
prospectively, as is often done in other tort contexts.10A
99. See Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuE L.J. 875, 909-911.
100. See Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 CoLunr. L. RLv. 716,
720 (1967).
101. Id. at 721.
102. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 448(1). Subsection (2) provides for declaratory judicial re.
lief where an officer "has reason to apprehend" that a claim may be made against him
for negligence, default, etc. Under the indemnity by-law permitted by Regulation 136 of
Table A of Schedule 1 to the Act, an officer thus relieved of liability under section 448
is to be indemnified (presumably for his expenses of litigation) by the corporation.
103. DErL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1967); MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar 9 4A (1967).
104. E.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 US. 858 (193
1102
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In sum, I think that the practice of protecting corporate executives
against litigation and liability has now been carried about as far as it
ought to be carried and perhaps a little farther. Corporate directors and
officers should eschew efforts to protect themselves, by direct indemni-
fication or insurance, from the consequences of breach of their duty not
to enrich themselves at the corporation's expense and from the conse-
quences of their gross negligence in the management of its affairs. And
if directors and officers do not show such self-restraint, then legislatures
and courts should supply the deficiency.
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.,V.2d 795 (1962). See
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463, 486 (1961); Note,
Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling a
Precedent, 60 H~nv. L. REV. 437 (1947).
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